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JUDICIAL FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE A
RESERVED GROUNDWATER RIGHT FOR
THE WIND RIVER INDIAN
RESERVATION, WYOMING
Paige Graening*

In 1975 local authorities planned to drill water wells to augment
supplies for the airfield and a proposed industrial park at the Riverton,
Wyoming Municipal Airport. Tribal authorities from the nearby Wind
River Indian Reservation, which had once owned the airport property,
asserted a claim upon groundwater under the airport as part of their
Winters rights' and objected to the drilling plans. Once again the unresolved fundamental dispute over scarce western water reared its head.
The time was ripe for a general adjudication to quantify, define, and integrate the rights of all parties to the waters in the Big Horn Basin.' In re
the General Adjudication of the Big Horn River System was trifurcated
* Attorney, New England Power Service Co. B.A., 1975, Lindenwood College; M.L.S, 1977,
University of Oklahoma; J.D., 1991, University of Tulsa.
I owe special thanks to Professor Gloria Valencia-Weber and Dr. James Ronda for their
thought-provoking leadership in the Native American Rights Course they co-taught at the University of Tulsa College of Law; and to Professor Judith Royster, Stetson University College of Law, for
her encouragement and support in writing this article.
1. The term "Winters rights" refers to the doctrine of reserved water rights that was asserted
in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
2. On January 22, 1977, the Wyoming Legislature enacted § 1-1-54.1 of the Wyoming statutes
which authorized the State to commence system-wide adjudications of water rights (current version
at Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-37-106 (1977)). Two days later, the State commenced the litigation known
as In re the General Adjudication of the Big Horn River Sys. and All Other Sources, 753 P.2d 76
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and lasted 12 years.3 Although Big Horn was essentially a local case, its
outcome is likely to have profound implications for other reservation
tribes whose water rights remain undefined.
Big Horn was an action to determine the water rights of numerous,
diverse parties within the Big Horn River System and all other sources of
water within Wyoming's Water Division No. 3.4 The principal issue of
the litigation was whether a reserved water right existed for the Wind
River Indian Reservation and, if so, the scope of the water reservation.
The ultimate outcome of this suit included findings that: (1) the purpose
of the reservation was to provide an agriculturally-based homeland for
the tribes; (2) there was intent to reserve water rights to the Wind River
Indian Reservation upon its creation; (3) there was no intent to reserve
groundwater rights for the reservation; and (4) the measure of the tribes'
(Wyo. 1988), aff'd in part by an equally divided Courtsub nom. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S.
406 (1989) [hereinafter Big Horn].
It is noteworthy that the Wyoming Legislature meets bi-annually, beginning in mid-January.
The fact that the Legislature provided for adjudication early in its first session after the Riverton
Municipal Airport confrontation indicates the high level of importance attached to the water rights
in the Big Horn Basin.
3. The case was divided into three phases: Phase I, Indian reserved water rights (decided by
the Big Horn litigation); Phase II, non-Indian federal reserved rights; and Phase III, state water
rights evidenced by a permit or certificate.
The initial trial on Indian rights, conducted by the special master (Teno Roncalio, a former U.S.
Representative from Wyoming), lasted from January 26, 1981 until December 1981. Completion of
the special master's 451 page report "Concerning Reserved Water Right Claims By and On Behalf of
the Tribes of the Wind River Indian Reservation" took until December 15, 1982. Report of the
Special Master at 7, In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn
River Sys. and All Other Sources, Civ. No. 4993 (Wyo. Dist. Ct. December 15, 1982) [hereinafter
Report]. The Report was then forwarded to the state district court, whose ruling was appealed to
the Wyoming Supreme Court. Following the state supreme court's three-to-two decision, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari for one issue-the Practicably Irrigable Acreage standard
for quantifying surface water rights under Winters-and affirmed Big Horn in a four-to-four decision.
A final judgment adjudicating the non-Indian federal reserved water rights, pursuant to stipulation, was entered February 9, 1983. Phase III determinations are still pending.
4. Id. at 1. Big Horn described Wyoming's Water Division No. 3 as:
[E]ssentially identical with what is known as the Big Horn River drainage basin .... It is
located in Fremont, Hot Springs, Washakie, Big Horn and Park counties in northwestern
and west central Wyoming and includes parts of Yellowstone National Park. Other federal
entities included are the Wind River Indian Reservation... consisting of approximately
4,000 square miles of land area, the Shoshone and Big Horn National Forest, the East Fork
Winter Elk Pasture, the Sheridan County Elk Winter Pasture, the Yellowtail Wildlife
Habitat Management Area, the Middle Creek Drainage Area of Yellowstone National
Park, the Big Horn Canyon National Recreation Area, and numerous public water
reserves, water wells and stock driveways upon federal lands administered by the Bureau of
Land Management.
Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 83.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol27/iss1/1

2

Graening: Judicial Failure to Recognize a Reserved Groundwater Right for th
RESERVED GROUNDWATER RIGHTS

1991]

reserved water right was the water necessary to irrigate practicably irrigable acreage.' Res judicata notwithstanding, whether or not this enormous investment of time, money, and effort will prove to be the final
examination of the stated issues remains to be seen.'
This article examines the judicial failure to find a reserved right to
groundwater for the Wind River Indian Reservation and shows that precedent exists for finding the right through treaty construction and case
law. Part I recounts the historical background of the Shoshone and
Arapaho Tribes. Part II of this article examines key elements of water
law and relevant groundwater cases. Part III reviews the canons of
treaty construction. Part IV probes the precedential and contemporary
interpretations of the principal treaty behind the Big Horn litigation. Finally, Part V explores some of the legal, social, and economic implications of exclusive state control over groundwater underlying the Wind
River Indian Reservation.
I.

HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE AND THE RESERVATION

The Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes, residents of the Wind River
Indian Reservation, first raised the issue of groundwater rights in the
Riverton Municipal Airport incident. The tribes' relationship to the
lands on which the airport stands was a determinative factor in their
objection to the water well drilling. The story of how and why these
tribes came to live on the reservation provides the legal and historical
foundation for the Big Horn adjudication. 7
Originally, the Shoshone were principally hunters and gatherers in
the western part of what is now Wyoming.' Although they had helped
Lewis and Clark on their trek to the Pacific Northwest between 1804 and
5. See generally Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76.
6. Certain issues raised were not decided within the framework of the litigation. For example,
because the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that the Indians did not have a reserved right to groundwater, the court did not reach the question as to whether the state owns the groundwater underlying
the Wind River Indian Reservation. Id. at 100. Any subsequent decision on this issue will undoubtedly have ramifications for Indian reservations and other federal enclaves.
7. The Bannock Tribe, linguistically and geographically related to the Eastern Shoshone, also
resided on the Wind River Indian Reservation during the early phase of its settlement. A widely
roving group, the Bannocks asserted that lands in the general area of the present reservation had
been their home in the past. See SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, BUREAU OF AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY,
BULLETIN 30, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIANS NORTH OF MEXICO, PART I, 129 (Frederick W.
Hodge ed. 1907).
8. For a description of the lifestyle of the Eastern Shoshone, see BARBARA A. LEPOER, A
CONCISE DICTIONARY OF INDIAN TRIBES OF NORTH AMERICA 429-31 (1979).
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1806, by mid-century the Shoshone had suffered greatly from white passersby and encroachers.9 The great Shoshone Chief Washakie had long
been tolerant of white development of the West, but by the late 1850s the
destruction of game and the depletion of grazing areas led many Shoshone warriors to join the wilder Bannocks in a general war against trail
travelers.10 In 1863 government forces assigned to protect the pioneer
trails inflicted a crushing defeat on the Shoshone near the Idaho-Utah
border. Subsequently, all the hostile tribes signed peace treaties in which
they agreed to permit white travel and railroad construction in return for
reservation life, supported by annuities of goods and food. 1
The 1863 Treaty of Fort Bridger, 2 signed by the Shoshone and the
United States, set aside a total of over forty-four million acres in Wyoming, Colorado, Idaho, and Utah for the tribe's use. 13 Concluding
that
this amount of land for Indian use alone was unrealistic, 4 the federal
government negotiated the 1868 Treaty of Fort Bridger. 1" Under this
Treaty, the Eastern Shoshone Tribe ceded its original reservation in exchange for lands in the Utah Territory (now Wyoming) and promises of
governmental support. The Treaty reduced the size of the tribe's holdings by more than ninety percent,1 6 but declared that the newly set aside
acreage in Wyoming "shall be... for the absolute and undisturbed use
and occupation of the Shoshonee Indians."1 7 Thus, the United States
Government created the Wind River Indian Reservation. 8
The Northern Arapahoes were also Plains hunters, but their political alliances were with the Sioux and Cheyenne. The Shoshone had long
been hostile to all three of these Powder River tribes. 19 Following
Custer's disastrous loss at the Battle of Little Big Horn, the Arapahoes
were imprisoned at Camp Robinson where they languished for one year
9. ANGIE DEBO, HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 161-62 (1970).

10. Id. at 161.
11. Id. at 162.
12. Treaty with the Eastern Bands of Shoshonee, July 2, 1863, U.S.-E. Shoshonee, 18 Stat. 685
(1875), reprintedin 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 848 (Charles J. Kappler ed. 1904).
13. United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 113 (1938).
14. See Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76, 83 (Wyo. 1988).
15. Treaty with the Eastern Band of Shoshonees and Bannack Tribe, July 3, 1868, 15 Stat. 673
(1869), reprintedin 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 1020 (Charles J. Kappler ed. 1904)
[hereinafter Fort Bridger Treaty of 1868].
16. See Shoshone, 304 U.S. at 113.

17. Fort Bridger Treaty of 1868, supra note 15, art. II, 15 Stat. at 674, reprintedin 2 INDIAN
AFFAIRS at 1020-21.
18. The Bannocks signed the treaty, but merely as an intermediate step toward the reservation
of their own lands. See id For a discussion of the historical implications of this treaty for the
Bannocks, see BRIGHAM D. MADSEN, NORTHERN SHOSHONI 52-53 (1980).
19. See DEBO, supra note 9, at 241.
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before the Shoshone took pity and gave them a temporary refuge on the
Wind River Indian Reservation.2' The federal government found it convenient to make this a permanent settlement. Despite the treaty's "absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" provision and the protests of
the Shoshone, the government carved a new homeland for the Arapahoe
out of the Wind River Indian Reservation.2 1 The Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes continue to live on the Wind River Indian Reservation, still
holding themselves apart from one another.2 2
A series of subsequent agreements further decreased the size of the
reservation. In 1872 the Shoshone Indians and the United States Government executed the Brunot Agreement, which provided for a cession of
some six hundred thousand acres of tribal lands in exchange for monetary compensation. 23 The next significant transaction involving land cessions was the First McLaughlin Agreement in 1896.24 The First
McLaughlin Agreement was a simple conveyance and purchase under
which the United States took full title to the subject lands.25 As in the
Brunot Agreement, nothing in this transaction placed either party in a
position of continuing responsibility or obligation to the other.
For
purposes of the Big Horn litigation, the most significant transaction affecting the reservation, other than the 1868 Treaty itself, was the Second
McLaughlin Agreement, commonly referred to as the 1905 Act.2 6
Under the terms of this transaction, the tribe ceded 1,480,000 acres to
the United States for disposal through sales to third parties. 27 Revenues
derived from the subsequent transactions were returned to the tribe for
development purposes. However, the land sales were not as successful or
far-reaching as intended and the federal government restored all unsold
lands to the reservation in 1934.28
20. Id.
21. Id. In 1927 Congress gave the Shoshone permission to litigate its claim for the loss of half

of the Reservation to the Arapahoe. In finally resolving the claim in Shoshone, the Supreme Court
found that the tribe's compensation must cover the timber and mineral resources on forsaken Reservation lands. Shoshone, 304 U.S. at 116.
22. DEBO, supra note 9, at 241.
23. Agreement with Shoshone Indians, Dec. 15, 1874, U.S.-Shoshone, ch. 2, 18 Stat. 291, 292
(1874) (also known as the Lander Purchase). Report, supra note 3, at 33.
24. Agreement with the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes in Wyoming, June 7, 1897, ch. 3, § 12,
30 Stat. 93 (1897) (also known as the Thermopolis Purchase). Report, supra note 3, at 34.
25. Report, supra note 3, at 34.
26. Agreement with Indians of the Shoshone or Wind River Reservation, Wyoming, March 3,
1905, ch. 1452, 33 Stat. 1016 (1905) (Second McLaughlin Agreement).
27. Report, supra note 3, at 36.
28. Id. at 36-37. In the Big Horn adjudication, the State of Wyoming asserted that the Second
McLaughlin Agreement had constituted a conveyance to the United States, which destroyed the
reserved water right relating back to 1868. Id. at 35-44. The special master and the Wyoming
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Finally, the Act of August 15, 195329 compensated the tribes for
certain lands within the Riverton Reclamation Project. These lands are
the site of the Riverton Municipal Airport.30 Since that date, the size of
the reservation has remained stable.3 1
II. WESTERN WATER
A.

The Doctrine of PriorAppropriation

The prior appropriation doctrine is a water allocation system developed as the arid West's alternative to traditional, eastern riparian

rights.32 Somewhat akin to the Rule of Capture, prior appropriation

gives water rights to users who are first in time. Beneficial use is the
basis, measure, and limit to the use of water.33
The doctrine of prior appropriation permits diversion of water to

remote lands. Appropriation rights are also quantified for a definite
amount of water and are not correlative.34 Junior users must yield to
Supreme Court rejected the state's argument. Both found that the language of the Second McLaughlin Agreement did not create a conveyance of land, but rather a cession of lands in trust to the
United States to be sold for tribal benefit if possible. Id. at 36. Under the 1934 restoration of ceded
lands to tribal ownership, the reserved water right resumed its priority date of 1868. Id. at 37-44.
See generally Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76, 92-93 (Wyo. 1988).
29. Act of August 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-284, ch. 509, 67 Stat. 592 (1953).
30. Report, supra note 3, at 7.
31. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 84.
32. According to Goldfarb, the doctrine of riparian rights generally holds that landowners adjacent to a watercourse may use such waters on their lands. Water rights are established by proximity to the watercourse. Developed in England, where rains are abundant, the riparian doctrine was
adopted early in the United States and continues in effect in the great majority of states east of the
Mississippi. See WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 21 (2d ed. 1988). In some states, riparianism
has been supplemented by permit systems. Id. The various states have modified pure riparian doctrine in different ways. Some, for example, restrict the use of diverted water to land which is actually
riparian to the watercourse. In most states, with no showing of actual harm, a riparian owner can
seek a court order enjoining another riparian from using water on lands not appurtenant to the
watercourse or outside the watershed. Id. at 21-22. Some states require evidence of tangible harm
before issuing an injunction or permitting the recovery of damages. Id. at 22. Still other states
permit riparian owners to make "reasonable" uses of water on lands not adjacent to the watercourse
or on trans-watershed lands. Id. Furthermore, riparian states have adopted either the "source of
title" or "unity of title" theories which differently govern the rights to use water on lands which have
been severed from the original riparian tract and later reunited with it. Id.
33. Initially defined by the courts, "beneficial use" is now generally codified. See, e.g., Wyo.
STAT. ANN.§ 41-3-101 (1977). "Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and limit of the right
to use water ....
" Id.
34. GOLDFARB, supra note 32, at 33.
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senior appropriators in times of shortage.3" Appropriative rights are indefinite in duration, but may be lost through non-use, abandonment, forfeiture, or prescription.3 6 In many jurisdictions, appropriative diversion
rights may be severed and transferred; changes in use or place of use, and

changes in point or method of diversion, are generally permissible if no
injury occurs to other users.3 7
Wyoming adopted the prior appropriation doctrine for surface waters in its Constitution 3' and has subsequently extended it to groundwater by statute.3 9 Statutory definitions of preferences for groundwater
use are the same as those for surface waters.'
Furthermore, Wyoming
law permits "any appropriator of either surface or underground water
[to] file a written complaint alleging interference with his water right by a
junior right."4 1
B.

The Nature of Groundwater
The National Water Commission has defined groundwater as

"water that exists... in the interstices of... rocks may be called subsur-

face water; that part of subsurface water in interstices completely saturated with water is called groundwater."'4 2 Generally, there are two
types of aquifers, or underground storage formations, containing signifi-

cant quantities of groundwater: (1) the relatively rare non-recharging
aquifers, which are cut off from the hydrologic cycle,4 3 and (2) the more
35. Id.
36. Significantly, however, reserved rights are not lost through non-use. Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
37. GOLDFARB, supra note 32, at 33-34.
38. WYO. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
39. Article I of the Wyoming Water Code, Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-101 (1977) states:
A water right is a right to use the water of the state, when such use has been acquired by
the beneficial application of water under the laws of the state .... Beneficial use shall be
the basis, the measure and limit of the right to use water at all times ....
In other scattered sections, the statutes indicate means of perfecting priority rights to surface and
groundwater.
40. Section 41-3-102 states preferred uses are for domestic and transportation purposes, steam
power plants and industrial purposes. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-102 (1977).
41. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-911 (1977).
42. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 230 (1973). Wyoming statute provides a less technical definition of groundwater: "[A]ny water, including hot water
and geothermal steam, under the surface of the land or the bed of any stream, lake, reservoir, or
other body of surface water, including water that has been exposed to the surface by an excavation,
such as a pit." Wyo. STAT. ANN.§ 41-3-901(a)(ii) (1977).
43. Professor Meyers has stated that few, if any, aquifers have zero recharge. However, some
are functionally non-recharging because their rate of recharge is measured in decades or centuries.
The Ogallala, underlying parts of Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Nebraska is a well-known example
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common recharging aquifers, which maintain a steady level because of an
equal inflow and outflow of water.
Surface flows of many streams at various times of the year depend
on full or near full underground aquifers that are in hydrologic continuity with the surface flows.' The National Water Commission recognized this relationship between surface and groundwater and framed its
recommendation as follows:
RECOMMENDATION No. 7-1: STATE LAWS SHOULD RECOGNIZE AND
TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE SUBSTANTIAL INTERRELATION OF SURFACE
WATER AND GROUND WATER. RIGHTS IN BOTH SOURCES OF SUPPLY
SHOULD BE INTEGRATED, AND USES SHOULD BE ADMINISTERED AND
MANAGED CONJUNCTIVELY. THERE SHOULD NOT BE SEPARATE
CODIFICATIONS OF SURFACE WATER LAW AND GROUND WATER
LAW; THE LAW OF WATERS
SHOULD BE A SINGLE, INTEGRATED
45
BODY OF JURISPRUDENCE.

Wyoming has recognized this interrelationship to some degree. Its statutes provide that:
Where underground waters in different aquifers are so interconnected as to constitute in fact one source of supply, or where underground waters and the waters of surface streams are so interconnected
as to constitute in fact one source of supply, priorities of rights to the
use of all such interconnected waters shall be correlated and such single schedule
of priorities shall relate to the whole common water
46
supply.

Several factors make groundwater an extremely attractive resource.
Stored in its natural condition, it does not require the capital outlay that
traditional surface water reservoirs require.47 In addition, groundwater
suffers little evaporative loss in storage. Although there are many concerns today regarding the pollution of aquifers by surface leaching and
migration of toxic and hazardous substances, groundwater in its natural
state is relatively pure and does not require expensive purification prior
to use in industrial processes. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
the increasing demand for water where surface resources are limited is
causing society to place new value on groundwater.48
of a functionally non-recharging aquifer. Charles J. Meyers, FederalGroundwaterRights:A Note on
Cappaert v. United States, 13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 377, 382 (1978).
44. Robert S. Pelcyger, Indian Water Rightv"Some EmergingFrontiers,21 ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INsT. 743, 759 (1975).
45. WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 42, at 233.
46. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-916 (1977).
47. See Pelcyger, supra note 44, at 761.

48. Id.
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The Winters Doctrine

Winters v. United States4 9 announced the doctrine of reserved water
rights which dictates that where land in territorial states was reserved by
treaty to the Indians, an implied water reservation necessary to support
the purpose of the reservation arose from the treaty and related back to
the creation of the reservation. The case involved the competing water
rights of reservation Indians and subsequent white settlers. Although the
federal government had set aside the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in
Montana Territory for Indian use,5 0 white settlers on lands ceded to the
federal government by the Indians invested substantial sums of money to
divert Milk River waters to benefit their own agricultural projects."1 On
behalf of the reservation tribes, the United States Government complained that the settlers' actions deprived the Indians of the use of water.
The United States Supreme Court found that even though the treaty was
silent on the issue of water rights, Congress could not have intended for
52
the Indians to dwell on the reservation without benefit of water rights.
Therefore, the Court held that where land in territorial states was reserved by treaty to an Indian tribe, an implied reservation of water necessary to support the purpose of the Indian reservation arose from the
treaty. 3 Since the reservation of water related back to the creation of the
Indian reservation, competing users such as the settlers could not appropriate such waters unless their appropriation was effective prior to the
creation of the reservation. 4 The Court also rejected the contention that
the United States had repealed the reservation of water rights when Mon55
tana was admitted into the Union.
The eighty-three year old Winters decision has been a source of significant litigation, particularly in the ard Western States, the site of
many federal reservations. Courts have, for example, struggled with the
quantification of Winters rights in cases such as Arizona v. California,6
which held that water was intended to satisfy the future as well as the
49. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
50. Agreement with the Indians of Gros Ventre, Piegan, Blood, Blackfeet, and River Crow
Tribes Establishing a Reservation, Montana, May 1, 1888, ch. 213, 25 Stat. 113 (1887-1889) (ap-

proved by an Act of Congress, April 15, 1874, ch. 96, 18 Stat. 28 (1875)).
51. Winters, 207 U.S. at 567.
52. Id. at 576-77.
53. See id. at 575-77.

54. Id. at 577.
55. Id. at 577-78.
56. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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present needs of the Indian reservation. Additionally, water must be reserved in amounts adequate to serve all the reservation's practically irrigable acreage.5 7
The Supreme Court may be lauded for its interpretation of the Fort

Belknap Reservation Treaty which gave rise to the Winters litigation.
The Court found that Congress intended for the Indians to find sustenance on their new homeland, even though the treaty included no express language concerning water.5 8 Yet this finding has created problems
because the Court based the Indian's water rights solely upon the original purpose of the reservation. The idea of restricting water rights to
those rights necessary to sustain the original purpose of the reservation
has been limited by subsequent decisions such as Big Horn.

D.

The Winters Doctrine Applied to Groundwater
The logic that caused the Winters court to establish the implied

water reservation-that Congress could not have intended for the reservation Indians to dwell and prosper without water rights-supports the
contention that the doctrine should also be extended to groundwater.5 9
This has been the reasoning and the conclusion of the courts that addressed the question within the context of the federal reserved right prior
to Big Horn."
The first case to examine groundwater rights within an Indian reservation was Tweedy v. Texas Co.61 The factual background is different

from that of Big Horn in that the case concerned the rights of an oil and
57. Id. at 600.
58. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
59. Many commentators have noted the logic of extending the reserved right doctrine to
groundwater. See, eg., FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 585-87 (1982);
Aaron H. Hostyk, Who Controls the Water?, 18 TULSA L.J. 1, 50-53 (1982); Meyers, supra note 43,
at 388-89; Marc P. Bouret, Note, Cappaert v. United States: A Dehydration of Private Groundwater
Use?, 14 CAL. W. L. REv. 382 (1978); Pelcyger, supra note 44, at 759; A. Dan Tarlock, One River,
Three Sovereigns: Indianand Interstate Water Rights, 22 LAND & WATER L. REV. 631, 647 (1987).
The Winters doctrine is the strongest analogue for study of a reserved groundwater right.
Others rights which might be developed include reserved fishing, trapping, and hunting rights. See,
e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), which remains the doctrinal source for off-reservation treaty fishing. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 406 (1968), held that where
Congress was silent on the issue, statutory termination of tribal supervision by the federal government and the conveyance of reservation lands to third parties did not abrogate reserved tribal hunting and fishing rights. An extended discussion of these other potential analogues is, however,
beyond the scope of this article.
60. The Supreme Court first applied the reserved rights doctrine to federal lands other than
Indian reservations in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963), which concerned surface
waters. Subsequent cases, discussed herein, have specifically addressed the reservation of
groundwater.
61. 286 F. Supp. 383 (D. Mont. 1968).
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gas lessee to use groundwater underlying non-Indian surface owners'
lands within an Indian reservation.6 2 However, the court's reasoning on
the reservation of groundwater is quite relevant to Big Horn. At issue
was whether the defendant oil and gas lessee owed damages to the plaintiff landowners for groundwater used in secondary recovery operations.
The plaintiffs' case failed because they could not establish title to the
groundwater as an incident to mere surface ownership of fee land within
the reservation. 63 Therefore, they could show no interference with their
rights. 64 However, in discussing the reserved right to groundwater, the
Tweedy court expressly reasoned that:
[T]he same implications which led the Supreme Court to hold that
surface waters had been teserved would apply to underground waters
as well. The land was arid-water would make it more useful, and
whether the waters were found
on the surface of the land or under it
65
should make no difference.
Although not binding on the Wyoming Supreme Court, Tweedy gives
strong support for the tribes' argument that they have Winters rights to
the groundwater underlying their reservation lands.
The landmark case of Cappaertv. United States66 first articulated a
reserved right to groundwater on non-Indian federal land reservations.
At issue was the reserved water right for Devil's Hole National Monument, which Congress had established in 1952 for the preservation of the
unique desert pupfish found in a subterranean pool. 67 In 1968 the Cappaerts established prior appropriation rights to groundwater in the area
through permits issued by the Nevada State Engineer. 68 However, when
their irrigation pumping began to decrease the water in Devil's Hole, the
United States Government moved to enjoin the Cappaerts' continued
water use. The United States Supreme Court stated, "[W]e hold that the
United States can protect its water from subsequent diversion, whether
the diversion is of surface or groundwater."'69 The Court could hardly
have made a clearer statement regarding the legality of the reservation of
62. The land was located on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation in Montana. Id.

63. Id. at 385.
64. The Tweedys' grantors, who had acquired the lands and minerals from the Blackfeet Tribe,
reserved the minerals when they conveyed the surface to the Tweedys. Id. at 383-85.

65. Id. at 385.
66. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).

67. Id. at 132-33.
68. Id. at 134.
69. Id. at 143 (emphasis added).
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groundwater. In keeping with Arizona v. California,7 0 the Court reasoned that need determines the extent of the reservation and rejected an
equitable balancing of competing users.7 Cappaert'streatment of the issue was most striking in that the Court found a reserved federal right to
groundwater, but found no need to invoke the right because the Court
declared that the pool at Devil's Hole was surface water.7 2 However,
Cappaert'sestablishment of a reserved right to groundwater, and its reiteration that the doctrine of reserved rights "extends to Indian reservations, ' 73 set the stage for establishing the reserved right to groundwater
for the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes in Big Horn.7 4
III.

CANONS OF TREATY CONSTRUCTION

The courts have adopted special rules of interpretation for Indian

treaties. The degree to which those rules figure in judicial interpretation
varies somewhat from case to case. However, the recognized canons of
treaty interpretation are generally acknowledged by courts.
First and foremost, Indian treaties are to be interpreted as the Indians understood them at the time of signing. 7 This canon is particularly

important in Indian treaty construction since tribal representatives were
often unable to read, speak or understand English-the language of the
drafters and the treaties themselves.76 In Jones v. Meehan, 7 the Supreme
Court explained the rationale for this principle:
70. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
71. Cappaet,426 U.S. at 138-39.
72. Id. at 142-43.
73. Id. at 138.
74. Not all water law authorities agree with the reservation theory as the best means of establishing groundwater rights. Professor Meyers' early readings of Cappaertled him to believe that:
[J]ust as Indian water rights under Winters provided the foundation for federal reserved
water rights on non-Indian reservations, federal groundwater rights on a National Monument under Cappaertwould provide the basis for Indian groundwater rights. I no longer
hold that view. I would argue that when an Indian Reservation was created ... a property
interest comparable to a fee simple absolute was set aside in trust for the tribe. The Indians
own the beneficial interest in all the resources on their land: soil, oil and gas, coal, other
minerals and groundwater. If this conceptualization is accepted, then Indian groundwater
rights are different in one important respect from non-Indian federal reserved groundwater
rights: the question of intent to reserve does not arise. Equitable title to the groundwater
passed to the tribe in precisely the same manner as title passed to the land and its other
resources.

Meyers, supra note 43, at 388. See supra note 59 for commentators who discuss the extension of the
Winters doctrine to groundwater.
75. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970).
76. The Shoshone court described the Native Americans who signed the 1868 Treaty of Fort
Bridger as "full-blood blanket Indians, unable to read, write, or speak English." United States v.
Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 114 (1938).
77. 175 U.S. 1 (1899).
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In construing any treaty between the United States and an Indian
tribe, it must always... be borne in mind that the negotiations for the
treaty are conducted, on the part of the United States, an enlightened
and powerful nation, by representatives skilled in diplomacy, masters
of a written language, understanding the modes and forms of creating
the various technical estates known to their law, and assisted by an
interpreter employed by themselves; that the treaty is drawn up by
them and in their own language; that the Indians, on the other hand,
are a weak and dependent people, who have no written language and
are wholly unfamiliar with all the forms of legal expression, and whose
only knowledge of the terms in which the treaty is framed is that imparted to them by the interpreter employed by the United States ....

A second canon of treaty construction requires that ambiguities
shall be resolved in favor of the Indians.

Worcester v.

Georgia,"0

9

In the landmark decision

Chief Justice Marshall wrote, "[T]he language

used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice.""s Thus, a goal of treaty interpretation is to achieve the reasonable

expectations of the weaker party, rectifying the unequal bargaining position by using a technique commonly employed in contract interpretation.

A third major canon of treaty construction requires consideration of
secondary sources of information to ascertain the true intent of the parties. For example, oral versions of the treaty, minutes of the proceedings,

and previous treaties between the same parties may be reviewed to clarify
meaning."

Treaty interpreters are encouraged to go beyond the four

comers of the document to resolve ambiguities and determine the parties'
understanding of the treaty.

Finally, the Supreme Court has articulated a duty of the United
States. The government must carry out the terms of treaties as they were
78. Id. at 10-11.
79. See, eg., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Carpenter
v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). Winters stated
that this rule of interpretation also extends to agreements with Indians. Id. at 576.
80. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
81. Id. at 582.
82. KIRKE KICKINGBIRD ET AL., INDIAN TREATIES 32 (1980). In Big Horn, the Supreme
Court of Wyoming stated that the special master's interpretation of the treaty was not a question of
fact but rather one of law. As such, the state's supreme court had full powers of review over the
special master's findings which freed the court to consider other evidence. Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76,
94-95 (Wyo. 1988). Relying on Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979), the court employed an interpretative approach to the treaty
that relied on the legal principles of contract law to determine intent. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 94. In
arriving at this interpretation, the court looked beyond the treaty to documents such as the Constitution of the State of Wyoming, the Second McLaughlin Agreement and the Minutes of Council,
Shoshone Agency, April 19, 1904. Id. at 98-115.
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understood by the Indians and do so "in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of this nation to protect the interests of a dependent people.""3
IV.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE TREATY

BEHIND BIG HORN

A.

The Purpose of the Wind River Indian Reservation

For the objectives of the Big Horn litigation, the treaty provisions of
principal import are articles II-IV, VI-IX, and XII.8 4 The purpose of the
reservation is both expressly and implicitly outlined within these provisions. Because the Winters doctrine ties the reservation of water rights to
the purpose of the reservation, these articles provide the critical foundation for the scope of water rights.
The single, broad purpose of the reservation-to establish a homeland for the Indians-can be reasonably inferred from the treaty. Article
I speaks of the Indians' desire to live in peace and article II speaks of the
Shoshone Tribe's "absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of the
reservation. 5 It is only in the later articles of the treaty that more specific uses of reservation land are outlined. Interpretation of the treaty
begins with a general sense that the Indians agreed to make their home in
a new place, with the belief that they would control its use and
occupation.
Although the treaty emphasizes agricultural pursuits by the Indians,
it by no means ignores other activities. References to hunting and provisions for many occupations such as blacksmithing, carpentry, sawmilling, and gristmilling are specifically mentioned in article M11.86 Whether
such occupations were intended merely to support an agrarian society or
whether they were intended to provide the Indians with alternative employment is not discussed. The Wyoming Supreme Court acknowledges
the existence of non-agricultural activities at Wind River in its review of
83. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942).
84. Fort Bridger Treaty of 1868, supra note 15, 15 Stat. at 674-76, reprinted in 2 INDIAN ApFAIRS at 1020-23.

85. Article II also provides that the Bannocks may request their own reservation "whenever the
Bannacks desire... or whenever the President... shall deem it advisable..., he shall cause a
suitable one to be selected for them ....Id. Pursuant to article II, the Bannocks eventually elected
to settle on the Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho. Exec. Order of July 30, 1869, reprintedin 1 INDIAN
AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATES 839 (Charles J. Kappler ed. 1904).

86. Fort Bridger Treaty of 1868, supra note 15, 15 Stat. at 674, reprintedin 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS
at 1020.
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documents outside the treaty. For example, the court stated, "Agree-

ments subsequent to the treaty acknowledge the continuance of non-agricultural activities on the reservation.... The reports of the Indian agents
are replete with descriptionsof and plansfor other activities.""
Prior to Big Horn, the Supreme Court established precedent for a
broad interpretation of the purpose of the Wind River Indian Reserva-

tion. In Shoshone, the Supreme Court stated that the "principal purpose
of the treaty was that the Shoshones should have, and permanently dwell
in, the defined district of country."8 8 Even with such a straightforward
statement of the reservation's broad purpose by the Court, the Wyoming

majority refused to see more than an agricultural objective for the tribes.
The Wyoming court stated, "The primary activity was clearly agricul-

tural."8 9 This narrow, single-minded interpretation of the treaty resulted
in Big Horn's conclusion that water rights for mineral, industrial, and
other non-agricultural uses were not reserved to the tribes. 90
Shoshone
provided additional precedential guidelines for interpreting the 1868
Treaty, but the majority in Big Horn ignored these guidelines. In deciding the extent of damages suffered by the Shoshone tribe due to the placement of the Arapahoes on the reservation, the Shoshone Court found that
"Iflor all practical purposes, the tribe owned the land.... The treaty,
though made with knowledge that there were mineral deposits and
standing timber in the reservation, contains nothing to suggest that the
United States intended to retain for itself any beneficial interest in
87. Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76, 98 (Wyo. 1988) (emphasis added). Documents on which the court
relied for this conclusion are the Brunot Agreement of 1872, supra note 23; the First McLaughlin
Agreement, supra note 24, and the Second McLaughlin Agreement, supra note 26.
88. United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938). This broad interpretative approach has been adopted by other courts construing other Indian treaties. In Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, the court found the permanent homeland idea to be "consistent with the
general purpose for the creation of an Indian reservation-providing a homeland for the survival and
growth of Indians and their way of life." 647 F.2d 42, 49 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981), modified, 752 F.2d 397 (9th cir. 1985). See also Montana v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 754, 768 (Mont. 1985) (stating the goals of the reservation system are to further
"Indian self-sufficiency").
89. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 98.
90. This is not to say that the tribes may not seek a change in use for their declared water
rights. However, they must submit to what appears to be hostile state law to effect such a change.
Section 41-3-104 of the Wyoming statutes permits a change of use or place of use applications to be
filed with the Board of Control. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-104 (1977). Applications are to be judged
on all pertinent facts, including: (1) the economic loss to. the community and state that may result
from transfer of the right; (2) the extent to which such economic loss will be offset by the new use;
and (3) whether other sources of water are available for the new use. Section 41-3-917 permits
applications to change the location of a water well if the groundwater right has been adjudicated.
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-917 (1977).
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them." 9 Accordingly, the Court, following the accepted canons of
treaty construction, resolved the ambiguity in the failure to reserve timber and mineral rights in favor of the Indians. Shoshone's reasoning and
finding-that the Indians' land included the natural resources appurtenant thereto--could have been extended in Big Horn to include groundwater. The tribes in Big Horn were not litigating the loss of any lands.
However, their claim to an underlying resource is quite analogous to the
facts of Shoshone.
The special master and the trial court attributed significantly different purposes to the creation of the Wind River Indian Reservation. In its
opinion, the Wyoming Supreme Court commented on the differing

interpretations:
The special master found as a matter of law that the treaty was unambiguous and ascertained the purpose for creation of the reservation...
stating... "[T]he principal purpose for entering into this Treaty was
to provide the Indians with a homeland where they could establish a
permanent place to live and to develop theircivilizationjust as any other
nation throughout history has been able to develop its civilization."
The district court ascertained the purpose of the reservation stating:
... "On the very face
of the Treaty, it is clear that its purpose was
92
purely agricultural.",

The astounding feature of these interpretations is their radical difference in concept and implication. The expansive view of the special
master is diametrically opposed to that of the district court which found
only a narrow, agricultural purpose in the reservation. The Wyoming
Supreme Court, in its review of articles VI, VIII, IX, and XII adopted
the district court's interpretation and found that "[t]he treaty does not
encourage any other occupation or pursuit [other than farming]." 93 The
court's adoption of the district court's treaty interpretation had serious
negative consequences on the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes' ultimate
water rights in this case. 94
91. Shoshone, 304 U.S. at 116-17.
92. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 94-95 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 97.
94. On behalf of the tribes, the government argued for the broadest view of the reserved water
right. It maintained that the Wind River Indian Reservation was established to provide a permanent
home for the Indians. As such, the United States contended that any purpose which furthered the
goal of establishing that permanent home is valid and should be included in quantifying the amount
of water to which the Indians are entitled. Report, supra note 3, at 65 (citing Legal Parameters for
United States' Statement of Claims, filed March 5, 1980, at 6). "The proposed purposes included
agriculture, livestock, fisheries and wildlife, mineral development, municipal and industrial uses and
aesthetics." Id. In keeping with Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), the United States argued
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Given the Indians' historical pursuit of hunting and gathering in the
same area as the reservation and given their weaker bargaining position
in the treaty negotiations, the question becomes whether the tribes truly
understood the long-term implications of the agricultural references in
the treaty. The answer to this question must be negative, for even the
drafters of the treaty proposed financial rewards for farming pursuits for
only a short period.95 Thus the farming provisions gave the Indians the
impetus to settle into a defined area and begin their integration into white
civilization. However, the Wyoming majority disregarded the special
master's "conclusion that the principal purpose of the United States in
entering into the Treaty of 1868 was to provide a permanent homeland
for the Indians so that they may, in whatever way most suitable to their
development, establish a permanent civilization on the Wind River Indian Reservation." 9 6 While citing rules which counseled against giving
treaties a restrictive meaning, 97 the state's high court ultimately relied on
United States Supreme Court dicta such as, "We cannot remake history"98 to justify its conclusion that the tribes' reserved water right pertained only to surface waters used for agricultural purposes.
that the water to satisfy these purposes must be measured by present and future Reservation needs.
Id.
The State of Wyoming argued that there was no reserved water right at all because: (1) the
language of the Treaty did not include such a reservation; and (2) Wyoming entered the Union on
the equal footing doctrine, which gave it full jurisdiction over the waters within its boundaries. Id.
at 56, 62-64.
Although none of the triers of fact accepted either of the state's arguments, which were clearly
contrary to Winters, the Wyoming Supreme Court decided the purpose of the reservation was
"clearly agricultural." Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 98. The court found insufficient evidence to support a
fishery flow right and found insufficient evidence of a tradition of wildlife and aesthetic preservation
to justify this as a purpose for the reservation. Id. at 98-99. Furthermore, it subsumed the water
requirements for livestock, municipal, domestic and commercial use within the agricultural purpose
of the reservation, and it denied a reserved water right for mineral and industrial uses. Id.
95. Article XII contains short-term economic incentives for farmers such as cash prizes for the
best crops during each of the three years following the execution of the treaty. Fort Bridger Treaty
of 1868, supra note 15, 15 Stat. at 676, reprinted in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS at 1023. In addition to
clothing, article IX provided annual stipends of $10 to "each Indian roaming" and $20 for "each
Indian engaged in agriculture" for the ensuing ten years. Id. If the Indians understood the plain
language of article IX, they could see an immediate financial benefit to farming. However, it is
unconscionable to bind a sovereign nation to an imposed occupation for all of time, based on provisions such as these.
96. Report, supra note 3, at 67 (emphasis added). In arriving at this conclusion, the special
master gave much weight to article II's "absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" language;
article IV's reference to the reservation as the "permanent home" of the Indians; and article VII's
reference to the desire of the United States to "insure the civilization of the tribes entering into this
Treaty." Id. at 67-68.
97. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 97 (quoting McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S.
164, 176 (1973)).
98. Id. (quoting Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 615 (1977)).
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The Wyoming Supreme Court acknowledged that "[t]he legal principles applicable to the interpretation of contracts apply also to interpretation of Indian treaties."99 Yet sua sponte, it did not consider the
unconscionability argument often used to void contracts signed by parties with unequal bargaining power. Given the policy of the nineteenth
century United States Government to turn the tribes into yeoman farmers who could progress into the white vision of American society, the
unconscionability argument begs to be raised."° The societal differences
between the pre-treaty Shoshone and Arapahoes and their descendants
now residing on the Wind River Indian Reservation-the differences between healthy, hearty groups able to care for themselves and today's poverty-stricken, woefully dependent tribes-prompts the question as to
whether the Indians really understood the limiting effects of the treaty.
Without a more favorable interpretation of the treaty, the Shoshone and
Arapahoes are locked into a time warp by the economic, social and cultural trappings of a society that the rest of America left behind earlier
this century.
B.

The Wyoming Interpretationof the Reserved Right to Groundwater

None of the triers of fact in Big Horn extended the clear language of
Tweedy or Cappaert to the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes' claims
against the pumping of groundwater underlying the Riverton Municipal
Airport. Their decisions reflect a very narrow view of the Winters
doctrine.'0 1
The special master found purposes for the reservation that ranged
far beyond the narrow agricultural objective ultimately adopted by the
Wyoming Supreme Court. However, his findings were constrained by
the United States Supreme Court's statement in Cappaert that the implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine is based on the necessity of
99. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 94.

100. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302 states that a determination of unconscionability is a
matter of law, not one of fact. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 3. Although U.C.C. § 2-302 governs transactions in goods, it has been applied to many other contractual agreements by analogy. See, eg.,
Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, 408 N.E.2d 1370 (Mass. 1989) (franchise agreement); Graham v. ScissorTail, 28 Cal. 3d 807 (1981) (contract to promote concert tour); Weaver v. American Oil, 276 N.E.2d
144 (Ind. 1971) (gas station lease); Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843 (N.J. 1967) (real
estate brokerage contract).
101. The trial court accepted the special master's finding that a reserved right to groundwater
had not vested in the tribes. The Wyoming Supreme Court did not discuss the lower court's rationale in doing so, but merely stated that the trial court did not err in this regard. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at
100.
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water for the purpose of the federal reservation. 10 2 Thus, the special
master required a showing of "use and need" for groundwater before a
reserved right might be found."0 3 This concept is a predominant feature
of prior appropriation law, but no support is given for its application to
lands held in trust for Indians by the United States Government. Factors
that were more practical than legal in nature appear to have driven the
special master to this conclusion." 4 The special master's use of Cappaert
was further limited by the concept of sustaining the purpose of the reservation. He reasoned that the Cappaertdoctrine could be applied to the
facts "[o]nly if the purpose for which the Wind River Indian Reservation
was created is threatened with defeat."'' 0 Apparently, the tribes did not
meet the court's vague criteria of "defeat." They were unable to prove a
sufficient need for the disputed groundwater.10 6 The special master continued, "There is nothing in Cappaertlaw, or in the Winters concept, or
in the evidence of this long proceeding, which warrants a right to the
tribes to impinge upon the groundwater users of adjoining areas, or those
of fee-owned inholdings within the boundaries of the Reservation." 10'
The Wyoming Supreme Court majority dispensed with the plain
language of both Tweedy and Cappaert more summarily. In an unexplained interpretation of Tweedy, the majority stated, "Tweedy... did
not recognize a reserved groundwater right." ' 8 As to Cappaert, the
court reasoned that since the Supreme Court had found the subterranean
pool at Devil's Hole to be surface water, there was no precedential case
supporting the tribes' claim of a reserved right to groundwater.1 0 9
Given the recognized significance of groundwater in Wyoming, and
its particular recognition as a supply source for the future, the Wyoming
Supreme Court could have applied the finding of Arizona v. CaliforniaI"
to the groundwater rights sought by the Wind River Indian Reservation.
102. Report, supra note 3, at 223.
103. Id. at 222-37.

104. "[T]o rule otherwise would constitute a clear danger to the source of groundwater for Indian and non-Indian alike who reside in the general area of the Wind River aquifer and other similarly shallow structures. It is sometimes addressed as a limited police power." Id. at 236 n.16.
105. Id. at 225.
106. The expert hydrologist for the United States Government relied on Cappaertand asserted
that the United States has a proprietary right and ownership to groundwaters under non-Indian
surface if those groundwaters are necessary for the well being of the Indians who live in a different
area from where the water is found. Id. at 226 n.7.
107. Id. at 225.
108. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 100.

109. Id at 99.
110. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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In that case, the United States Supreme Court applied the Winters doctrine and held that when the federal government created the five Indian
reservations at issue, it reserved enough water "to satisfy the future as
well as the present needs of the Indian Reservations." '
Alternatively, if the Big Horn court had recognized a more significant interrelationship between the aquifers underlying the reservation
and adjacent lands, or between the aquifer underlying the Riverton Reclamation Area and the tribes' reserved rights to surface water, then the
application of Winters could have been legally and scientifically logical.
Winters recognized the tribes' right to surface water. If the court had
recognized the interrelationship between surface and ground water as is
suggested by the National Water Commission, 2 the court could have
logically extended Winters to groundwater.
Considering the magnitude of the Big Horn adjudication, the state's
high court gave little attention (only four terse paragraphs) to the
groundwater issue. With little explanation of its reasoning, the Big Horn
majority simply stated, "[W]e hold that the reserved water doctrine does
not extend to groundwater." 1 3 Apparently, it did not recall Winters'
reasoning: "We realize that there is a conflict of implications, but that
which makes for the retention of the waters is of greater force than that
' 14
which makes for their cession."
V.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE A
.
RESERVED RIGHT TO GROUNDWATER

The implications of Big Horn's holding for purposes of treaty construction are indeed negative. The decision appears to permit courts to
pay lip service to the canons of treaty interpretation but then proceed
according to local political pressures. The 1868 Treaty of Fort Bridger
promised the Shoshone the "absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of the lands subject to the treaty. 1 5 Granted, the Wyoming
Supreme Court found an implied reservation of surface water to support
111. Id at 600.
112. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.

113. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 100. Although the special master did not find a reserved right to
groundwater for the tribes, he did award them the "use of groundwater" from specified sources,
subject to monitoring by the State Engineer. Report, supra note 3, at 332. The Wyoming Supreme
Court did not mention this "award" in its decision. However, the court did state that it was not
addressing the ownership of the groundwater issue. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 100.
114. Winters, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).
115. Fort Bridger Treaty of 1868, supra note 15, art. II, 15 Stat. at 674, reprintedin 2 INDIAN
AFFAIRs at 1020-21.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol27/iss1/1

20

1991]

Graening: Judicial Failure to Recognize a Reserved Groundwater Right for th
RESERVED GROUNDWATER RIGHTS

tribal "use and occupation." However, in failing to establish such a right
for groundwater, the court has limited the tribes' congressionally-approved treaty rights of controlling their homeland.1 16 This damaging
precedent does not bode well for future treaty interpretation by courts.

Even a cursory look at the implications of Big Horn's groundwater
holding reveals that it will harm Indian interests. Legally, economically,
and socially the Big Horn decision will affect the Shoshone and Arapahoe
Tribes well into the future. 1 7 The results of the adjudication are also
likely to bear on future decisions to determine the nature and extent of

other reservation tribes' groundwater rights.11

In pure economic terms,

116. Even where the court did find a reserved right-i.e., to instream flow-it subjected the
tribes' interest to state authority for administrative purposes. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 114, The state
proved hostile and the tribes filed a complaint. The Fifth Judicial District Court of Wyoming recently found that the state engineer had "difficulty assuming a neutral role in the administration of
the reserved water rights" and assigned those duties to the tribal water resources agency. In re the
General Adjudication of the Big Horn River Sys. and all Other Sources, Civ. No. 4993, (Wyo. Dist.
Ct. March 11, 1991). Although this ruling permits the tribes certain authority over Indian and nonIndian water rights, it does not alter in any way the legal absence of groundwater rights.
117. For thought-provoking insight into Indian economic development, see Frank Pommersheim, Economic Development in Indian Country: What Are The Questions?, 12 AM. INDIAN L. REv.
195 (1984). Professor Pommersheim takes a cultural approach and counsels that many of the
"problems" with economic development in Indian country arise because the right "questions" are
not posed in the first place. Id. at 196. On a pragmatic level, he recommends that "tribes should not
lease tribal natural resources or accept sweeping personal services contracts that do not permit the
tribe to actively participate in the venture." Id. at 212. In addition to the implicit employment
opportunities that would come with such participation, Pommersheim suggests that this would increase tribal management and technical capabilities. Id. See also, ROBERT H. WHITE, TRIBAL AssaTs (1990) for a detailed narrative account of four tribes' economic development efforts. White's
account includes the Ak-Chin's water project, enabled by settlement (Act of July 28, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-328, 92 Stat. 409 (1978)) and later enactment of Act of Oct. 19, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-530, 98
Stat. 2698 (1984).
118. Several tribes have opted to settle their water rights disputes via mediation rather than
assume the risks of litigation. Congressional policy under the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C.
§ 666 (1988), has been interpreted to mean that state courts have jurisdiction over general adjudications of water rights. This was a preliminary issue in Big Horn. Big Horn, 743 P.2d at 88. With
good reason, many tribes consider state courts hostile to tribal interests. Settlements which have
acknowledged tribal rights to use groundwater include the Southern Arizona Water Resources Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1261 (1982) (SAWRSA). SAWRSA specified that 10,000
acre feet of the Papago Tribe's (now recognized as the Tohono O'odham Nation) annual allocation
of 76,000 acre feet should come from groundwater pumping on the reservation. RODNEY T. SMITH,
TRADING WATER 68 (1988). The Papagos dealt from a position of relative strength because Congress refused to appropriate money for the massive Central Arizona Project until tribal water rights
were decided. Nonetheless, the Papago Tribe "waived any claims to water rights other than those
established by SAWRSA." Id. Another settlement example is that of the Ak-Chin Indian Community, which includes groundwater rights. Act of July 28, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-328, 92 Stat. 409
(1978), as amended by Act of Oct. 19, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-530, 98 Stat. 2698 (1984). It should be
realized, however, that these settlements do not define groundwater rights as reserved rights, as the
Shoshone and Arapahoe sought to do. Rather, they quantify water rights and acknowledge that
parts of the rights will be met by groundwater resources.
Other powerful forces, as well, are pushing for settlement of water rights disputes. President
Bush announced that disputes regarding Indian water rights should be resolved through negotiated
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the Big Horn decision is a two-edged sword. The tribes were successful
in preserving the Practicably Irrigable Acreage (PIA) standard as a
means of measuring their rights to surface waters for agricultural pur-

poses. 119 This may be considered a major victory in protecting tribal
rights from encroachment by competing users. However, the tribes were
unsuccessful in convincing the Wyoming Supreme Court of their right to
use water for other purposes. Although the Big Horn court determined

that the tribes had a reserved right to use water for municipal, domestic,
livestock, and commercial uses, it implied that those uses were merely
parts of the larger agricultural reservation right.1 20 The tribes failed to
obtain other rights to surface waters when the Wyoming Supreme Court
denied them a reserved water right for mineral and industrial uses and
for wildlife and aesthetic preservation.12 1 As discussed above, judicial
failure to recognize a reserved right to groundwater effectively places tri122
bal use of this natural resource under state control.

The failure of Big Horn to recognize more expansive water rights for
the tribes is particularly disturbing when one considers the dire economic

condition of the reservation. The Big Horn decision, while important in
preserving the PIA standard, may be of limited value for the future development of the Indians' homeland. The reservation is the nation's
third largest containing some two and one half million acres and a popu-

lation of 4500 Indians in 1980.123 Mainly high desert, its elevation
ranges from 4500 feet above sea level on the plains to 12,500 feet in the
settlements rather than litigation when in 1989 he signed into law the Puyallup Tribe of Indians
Settlement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-41, 103 Stat. 83 (1989). The United States Department of
Interior has recently promulgated guidelines to implement the President's policy of negotiation. See
Criteria and Procedures for Indian Water Rights Settlements, 55 Fed. Reg. 9223 (1990). For a
critique of these guidelines, see Eileen Shimizu, Indian Water Rights, 38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 88
(1991).
119. The Wyoming Supreme Court quantified the tribes' reserved surface water right as "the
amount of water necessary to irrigate all of the reservation's practicably irrigable acreage." Big
Horn, 753 P.2d at 101. Central considerations in this computation are the arability of the lands,
economic feasibility, and efficiency ratings. A discussion of these factors is beyond the scope of this
article, since they become important only after a right to water is legally established. Even so,
groundwater use is generally measured against a "safe yield" standard, which is "the maximum
amount of water that could be extracted annually, year after year, without eventually depleting the
underground basin." City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1263 (Cal. 1975).
Without comment, the Supreme Court upheld the Big Horn's use of the PIA standard in its four-tofour decision in Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
120. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 98-99.
121. Id. The Big Horn majority found that "the Tribes and the United States did not introduce
sufficient evidence of a tradition of wildlife and aesthetic preservation which would justify finding
this to be a purpose for which the reservation was created and for which water was impliedly reserved." Id. at 99.
122. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
123. Brief for Tribal Respondents on Writ of Certiorari at 45 & n.64, Wyoming v. UnitedStates,
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Wind River Mountains. 124 The Wind River, which bisects the reservation, drains the mountains on the west and joins the Popo Agie River to
form the Big Horn River, which flows along the eastern reservation
boundary. 2 Despite this vast land area and the small number of people
dependent on its bounty for their livelihood, the economic condition of
the tribes is pathetic. According to a 1980 survey which studied life on
the Wind River Indian Reservation, the average family income on the
reservation was only $6200.26 Forty-six percent of reservation households had no income whatsoever.' 2 7 At the time of the survey, during
peak employment months, the overall unemployment rate stood at an
astounding seventy-one percent. 128 The survey furthermore commented
on the lack of basic transportation, adequate housing, medical care, gar29
bage service, and supervised recreational activities for children.
Water is an undisputed key to economic development in the West.
Securing the tribes' rightful share-that which was implicitly reserved in
the treaties and agreements with the United States Government-is of
paramount importance in the improvement of their economic and social
welfare. Although the reservation overlies abundant mineral wealth, the
tribes are unable to fully benefit from their natural resources. The primary recovery of oil and gas began declining during the 1970s which
seriously reduced the tribes' largest source of income.' 3 0 The principal
method of secondary recovery for oil and gas is waterflooding, which
utilizes groundwater to force trapped hydrocarbons out of formations. 3 1
492 U.S. 406 (1988) (No. 88-309). The Arapahoes currently comprise 63.4% of the Reservation
population. Id at 24a.
124. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 83.
125. Id at 118.
126. Executive Summary of Final Report, Wind River Needs Determination Survey (1988), reprinted in Respondents Brief at 25a, Wyoming (No. 88-309). Funds for the survey came from the
State of Wyoming, the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the tribes themselves. Although current data
may vary somewhat from that collected in 1980, the quoted statistics are those with which the tribes
supported their case.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 27a.
129. Id. at 32a.
130. Shoshone & Arapahoe Tribes, Wind River Economic Development Planning Program,
Overall Economic Development Program (1976), reprintedin Brief for Tribal Respondents on Writ
of Certioria, Wyoming (No. 88-309).
131. Secondary recovery is generally recognized as a natural resource conservation measure because it prevents the "loss" of oil and gas in the ground. Oil and gas law recognizes an implied
covenant to develop such resources. See generally EUGENE KuNTz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF

OIL AND GAS § 4.8 (1987). States with oil and gas reserves have enacted conservation statutes and
promulgated regulations to encourage the efficient and economic development of hydrocarbons. Id.
§ 65; INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION, SUMMARY OF STATE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS FOR OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION (1990).
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The Big Horn decision does not permit the tribes to use the groundwater underlying the reservation for such economic development without
state approval. Despite the "absolute and undisturbed use" language of
the 1868 Treaty of Fort Bridger, the tribes and their lessees must now
seek permission from the State of Wyoming to use groundwater for development of this natural resource. The underpinning philosophy of
prior appropriation law makes it clear that Wyoming will consider water
use for tribal mineral development junior to already-established non-Indian uses. Big Horn has precluded the tribes' ability to develop other
economically beneficial uses of groundwater. Water transfer rights and
the concept of water marketing are highly charged issues throughout the
West. Because of the fundamental role of water in the evolution of western American society, water transfer and water sale rights are potentially
quite valuable-both economically and politically. The special master,
the district court, and the Wyoming Supreme Court all denied a tribal
right to export groundwater. 132 Thus, another avenue of possible economic revenue to be derived from "the absolute and undisturbed use and
occupation of said lands" has been foreclosed by the courts.
The overarching social results of the groundwater decision in Big
Horn are dismaying. The Wyoming Supreme Court's utter lack of concern over the implications of its treaty interpretation indicates that the
development of the Indians' place within society is once again the victim
of legal maneuvering. Perhaps Justice Thomas put it best in his dissent
from Big Horn:
I cannot agree that the implied reservation of water with respect to the
Wind River Indian Reservation should be limited, as the majority has
held .... The fault that I find with such a limitation is that it assumes
that the Indianpeoples will not enjoy the same style ofevolution as other
people, nor are they to have the benefits of modern civilization. I would
understand that the homeland concept assumes that the homeland will
not be a static place frozen in an instant of time but that the homeland
will evolve and will be used in different ways as the Indian society
132. Report, supra note 3, at 320; Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76, 100 (Wyo. 1988). The Wyoming
Supreme Court reported that "[tlhe Tribes did not seek permission to export reserved water." Big
Horn, 753 P.2d at 100. However, Plaintiff's Exhibit WRIR BG-3, at [1] asserted, "Both their reserved right and their ownership of the resources of the Reservation assure the Tribes the use of
minable groundwater if they choose and their prevention of such mining by anyone else." At least
one party attacked the constitutionality of the district court's prohibition of groundwater exportation. Id. The state's high court declined to address this issue because it did not find a reserved tribal
right to groundwater. Id. Presumably, since the court found no right, it could not find the abridgement of a right. The special master did not view his ruling as an undue burden on interstate commerce "inasmuch as no similar denial is made herein regarding surface waters awarded to the
Tribes." Report, supra note 3, at 320.
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develops. For that reason, I would hold that the implied reservation of
water rights attaching to an Indian reservation assumes any use that
3
1 3 is
appropriate to the Indian homeland as it progresses and develops.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Wyoming Supreme Court's failure to establish a reserved right
to groundwater for the Wind River Indian Reservation is legally unsound. Its Big Horn decision is flawed from the beginning because of the
narrow and single-minded interpretation that it gave to the 1868 Treaty
of Fort Bridger. Big Horn has implicitly trapped the Shoshone and
Arapahoe Tribes in a time warp by limiting their use of water to that
established in the decision and that which they can obtain through state
bureaucratic channels. Although the court acknowledged the proper
precedents for establishing a reserved right to groundwater in analogous
contexts, it misconstrued them to the detriment of the tribes. Consequently, Native American interests in groundwater have suffered a severe
setback in Big Horn.
133. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 119 (emphasis added). District Judge Hanscum, who was seated on
the state's Supreme Court for Big Horn, joined in this portion of the dissent. Thus, the limitation of
the reserved right was a three-to-two decision. Neither Thomas nor Hanscum directly addressed the

groundwater claim as a separate matter within the reserved right.
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